Four-Star General ADMITS He Was Paid by Iranian Regime-Change Group
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Claim 1
“This is a memo that describes how we're going to take out seven countries in 5 years, starting with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and finishing off Iran.”
Wesley Clark says a Pentagon memo described a plan to take out seven countries within five years, beginning with Iraq and continuing through Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran.
The quotation accurately reflects Clark's later public account, but the existence and contents of the alleged Pentagon memo have not been independently established in the available documentary record. Official records confirm pre-existing U.S. regime-change policy toward Iraq, not a verified seven-country, five-year plan.
Sources
- 1Gen. Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid: “I Think About It Every Day”↗
Supports
This is a memo that describes how we're going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran.
- 27 Countries in 5 Years: Wesley Clark’s Pentagon Memo Claim↗
Background
Whether or not such a memo existed in the form Clark described, the allegation resonated because the United States did, in fact, conduct military operations or exert significant coercive pressure in most of those seven countries over the following two decades.
- 3U.S. Policy Toward Iraq↗
Background
Our policy of containment plus regime change is designed to help protect the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from an aggressive and hostile regime.
- 1Gen. Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid: “I Think About It Every Day”↗
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Claim 2
“I also knew that we'd been scheming to find a reason to invade and finish off Saddam Hussein.”
The United States had been scheming to find a reason to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein before the Iraq War.
Public records show that the United States had adopted regime change in Iraq as an official policy before the 2003 invasion, including through the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. They do not establish the more specific allegation that officials were 'scheming to find a reason' for the invasion.
Checked twice, independently: the first pass returned Misleading and the second Unverifiable. Recorded as Unverifiable.
Sources
- 1Iraq Liberation Act of 1998↗
Background
To establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq.
- 2Operation Iraqi Freedom↗
Background
In his January 29, 2002, State of the Union address, he argued that “Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror” and that it, along with Iran and North Korea, constituted an “axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”
- 1Iraq Liberation Act of 1998↗
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Claim 3
“one of the top US generals went to the Pentagon and was told that the Bush administration was planning to attack seven countries in the Middle East in the span of just 5 years.”
The Bush administration was planning to attack seven countries in the Middle East over five years as a response to 9/11.
This is a stronger formulation of Clark's account, but available evidence does not independently verify that the Bush administration adopted such a seven-country plan or that it was framed as a response to 9/11. The documented evidence establishes an Iraq regime-change policy, not the full claim as stated.
Sources
- 1Gen. Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid: “I Think About It Every Day”↗
Supports
This is a memo that describes how we're going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran.
- 2Iraq Liberation Act of 1998↗
Background
An act to establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq.
- 3CONTAINING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S IRAQ↗
Background
The Administration has pursued a policy towards Iraq that rests on three pillars: containment of Saddam Hussein to prevent him from rebuilding his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs or threatening his neighbors; humanitarian relief for the Iraqi people to minimize their suffering at the hands of Saddam Hussein; and supporting regime change to remove Saddam Hussein from power so that Iraq and its neighbors can live in peace.
- 1Gen. Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid: “I Think About It Every Day”↗
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Claim 4
“many years ago, a B-25 bomber ran into the Empire State Building and hit the 79th floor”
A B-25 bomber crashed into the Empire State Building and struck the 79th floor.
On July 28, 1945, a B-25 bomber crashed into the Empire State Building, striking the 78th, 79th, and 80th floors. The statement is accurate, though the crash involved more than only the 79th floor.
Sources
- 170 Years Ago, a B-25 Bomber Crashed Into the Empire State Building↗
Supports
At 9:40am, the bomber smashed into the 78th, 79th and 80th floors of the Empire State Building.
- 170 Years Ago, a B-25 Bomber Crashed Into the Empire State Building↗
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Claim 5
“months before the attacks, anti-Taliban leader Ahmed Sharma Massud had warned the European Parliament about a large scale attack on US soil”
Ahmad Shah Massoud warned the European Parliament months before 9/11 about a major al-Qaeda attack threatening the United States.
Massoud visited the European Parliament in April 2001 and warned about the threat al-Qaeda posed to the United States. Contemporary reporting also records his warning that terrorists would soon damage the United States and Europe.
Sources
- 1Study on Afghanistan↗
Supports
In April 2001, Massoud warned the Parliament about the political, military and economic support the Taliban was receiving from Pakistan and the threat al-Qaeda posed to the USA.
- 2What Defined Ahmad Shah Masud↗
Supports
Masud gave this warning in an address at the European Parliament in Brussels in April, 2001.
- 1Study on Afghanistan↗
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Claim 6
“the CIA warned the White House of a terrorist attack”
The CIA warned the White House about a terrorist attack before 9/11.
Before September 11, CIA reporting and briefings conveyed repeated warnings about al-Qaeda operations and possible attacks in the United States. The warnings were general and did not specify the exact date, targets, or method of the 9/11 attacks.
Sources
- 1The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 8↗
Supports
Reports similar to many of these were made available to President Bush in morning intelligence briefings with DCI Tenet, usually attended by Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice.
- 2The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 8↗
Supports
The next day brought a report that a phone call to a U.S. embassy had warned that Bin Ladin supporters were planning an attack in the United States using "high explosives."
- 1The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 8↗
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Claim 7
“A month before the attack, the president's daily briefing was famously titled Bin Laden determined to strike in the US.”
The August 6, 2001 President's Daily Brief was titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US."
The August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Brief contained an article titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US." The transcript's wording differs slightly in capitalization and spelling but identifies the correct document.
Sources
- 1The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 8↗
Supports
The result was an article in the August 6 Presidential Daily Brief titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US."
- 2Fact Sheet: The August 6, 2001 PDB↗
Supports
The August 6, 2001 Pdb Item Entitled "bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US" was prepared in response to questions asked by the President about the possibility of attacks by al-Qaida inside the United States.
- 1The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 8↗
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Claim 8
“There was talk of potential hijackings.”
There were warnings or intelligence references involving possible hijackings before 9/11.
The August 6 PDB referred to patterns consistent with preparations for hijackings, and FAA warnings also addressed the possibility of hijacking-related attacks. These warnings did not specify the 9/11 plot's precise method or targets.
Sources
- 1The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 8↗
Supports
Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.
- 2Fact Sheet: The August 6, 2001 PDB↗
Supports
Although the PDB referred to the possibility of hijackings, it did not discuss the possible use of planes as weapons.
- 1The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 8↗
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Claim 9
“the Bush administration had said that Osama bin Laden that was a terrorism that was that was a Clinton problem. They weren't too worried about it.”
The Bush administration characterized al-Qaeda terrorism as a Clinton-era problem and was not very concerned about it in spring 2001.
The exact reported remark is not established by the public documentary record cited here. The 9/11 Commission did find that terrorism was not the overriding national-security concern under the pre-9/11 Bush administration, while also documenting that officials were receiving briefings and developing policy toward al-Qaeda.
Sources
- 1The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 6↗
Background
Clarke said that the new team, having been out of government for eight years, had a steep learning curve to understand al Qaeda and the new transnational terrorist threat.
- 2The 9/11 Commission Report, Executive Summary↗
Background
Terrorism was not the overriding national security concern for the U.S. government under either the Clinton or the pre-9/11 Bush administration.
- 1The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 6↗
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Claim 10
“various intelligence agencies say sources and methods we can't tell you. But eventually they did cough it up and we stopped the guy coming over the border from Canada who's going to go to LAX and cause a big problem at LAX.”
Intelligence agencies eventually shared the relevant information, leading to Ressam's arrest and preventing his planned attack at LAX.
Ressam was indeed arrested and his plot targeted LAX, but the available official account does not support the implied causal sequence that interagency disclosure produced the arrest. The 9/11 Commission described the arrest as resulting from an alert Customs agent and said the LAX planning was learned later.
Omits: The account omits that Ressam was arrested after an alert Customs agent noticed suspicious behavior, while investigators did not learn that LAX was the planned target until evidence was reexamined in 2000 and Ressam cooperated in May 2001.
Sources
- 1National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States hearing↗
Refutes
It was because a very alert Customs agent named Diana Dean and her colleagues sniffed something about Ressam.
- 2The 9/11 Commission Report↗
Refutes
They did not learn about the Los Angeles airport planning until they reexamined evidence seized in Montreal in 2000; they obtained further details when Ressam began cooperating in May 2001.
- 1National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States hearing↗
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Claim 11
“we stopped the guy coming over the border from Canada who's going to go to LAX and cause a big problem at LAX.”
Ahmed Ressam was stopped while entering the United States from Canada with a plot targeting Los Angeles International Airport.
Ahmed Ressam was arrested at Port Angeles, Washington, on December 14, 1999, while entering from Canada with explosives and materials indicating that Los Angeles International Airport was the target.
Sources
- 1Millennium Plot/Ahmed Ressam — FBI↗
Supports
On December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam—a 32-year-old Algerian—aroused the suspicion of alert border guards at Port Angeles, Washington, as he was attempting to enter this country.
- 2Millennium Plot/Ahmed Ressam — FBI↗
Supports
Under questioning, Ressam admitted that he planned to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on the eve of the millennium celebrations.
- 1Millennium Plot/Ahmed Ressam — FBI↗
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Claim 12
“on September the 15th, 2001, 4 days after 11, four days after 911, excuse me, you told CNN that ideally there would be quote no requirement for US military forces that diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement could do much of the work.”
Wesley Clark told CNN on September 15, 2001, that ideally no U.S. military forces would be required and that diplomacy, intelligence, and law enforcement should lead the response.
CNN's September 15, 2001 transcript records Clark saying that the first line of action should be diplomatic, intelligence, informational, and police measures, and that ideally there would be no requirement for U.S. military forces.
Sources
- 1CNN transcript, America's New War, September 15, 2001↗
Supports
None of that necessarily involves the US military. And ideally, their will be no requirement for U.S. military forces.
- 1CNN transcript, America's New War, September 15, 2001↗
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Claim 13
“I was with the former Secretary of State Coen Powell, he had gone to Iraq early in his tenure as Secretary of State. he come back with a proposal for smart sanctions and it was blown off by the administration.”
Colin Powell had visited Iraq early in his tenure as secretary of state and returned with a smart-sanctions proposal that the Bush administration dismissed.
Powell did promote a smart-sanctions plan in early 2001, but the administration did not simply dismiss it: President Bush publicly endorsed making sanctions more effective, and State Department records describe the policy as an active administration initiative.
Omits: Powell’s February 2001 trip was a Middle East tour rather than a trip to Iraq, and official U.S. records show the Bush administration publicly pursued and worked to implement a “smart sanctions” proposal.
Checked twice, independently: the first pass returned False and the second Misleading. Recorded as Misleading.
Sources
- 1Briefing for the Press Aboard Aircraft En Route Brussels — U.S. Department of State↗
Refutes
So this is part of the instruction I had from President Bush: go out and consult, come back and tell me what you found out.
- 2President Bush and Prime Minister Blair Hold Press Conference, February 26, 2001↗
Refutes
Colin Powell left today, after lunch, to move around the Middle East, collect thoughts and to listen, with a policy of strengthening our mission to make it clear to Saddam Hussein that he shall not terrorize his neighbors, and not develop weapons of mass destruction.
- 3Iraq Slams 'Smart Sanctions' — CBS News↗
Supports
Secretary of State Colin Powell has called for changes that would permit export to Iraq of more consumer goods while maintaining curbs on assistance to President Saddam Hussein's weapons program.
- 1Briefing for the Press Aboard Aircraft En Route Brussels — U.S. Department of State↗
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Claim 14
“they were and had been talking about what to do about Saddam Hussein”
The Bush administration had been discussing what to do about Saddam Hussein before September 11, 2001.
Contemporaneous accounts show that Iraq policy, sanctions, and possible military options were being considered during the first part of 2001, before the September 11 attacks.
Sources
- 1Department of State Washington File: Transcript of Colin Powell interview↗
Supports
So it was a subject that was on our mind throughout the first part of 2001, even before 9/11 came along.
- 2The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 10↗
Supports
Franks told us that he was pushing independently to do more robust planning on military responses in Iraq during the summer before 9/11—a request President Bush denied, arguing that the time was not right.
- 1Department of State Washington File: Transcript of Colin Powell interview↗
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Claim 15
“I recall that on the day of 911, there was a report that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld sent a note to the president of the United States saying, "Uh, this isn't this what we need to go after Saddam Hussein."”
On September 11, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld sent President Bush a note asking whether the attacks provided a reason to go after Saddam Hussein.
The 9/11 Commission confirms that Rumsfeld discussed hitting Saddam on the day of the attacks, but it describes contemporaneous notes of instructions to General Myers rather than a note to President Bush containing the quoted wording. The transcript therefore conflates related but distinct records.
Omits: The contemporaneous account identifies Rumsfeld as instructing General Myers to gather information and considering striking Saddam, not as sending President Bush the quoted note; a separate September 17 memo making a similar argument was written by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld.
Sources
- 1The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 10↗
Background
On the afternoon of 9/11, according to contemporaneous notes, Secretary Rumsfeld instructed General Myers to obtain quickly as much information as possible.
- 2The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 10↗
Supports
The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time—not only Bin Ladin.
- 3The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 10↗
Refutes
Writing to Rumsfeld on September 17 in a memo headlined "Preventing More Events," he argued that if there was even a 10 percent chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, maximum priority should be placed on eliminating that threat.
- 1The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 10↗
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Claim 16
“I got a call the next day from a friend of mine who was running a analysis bureau in Canada saying, "You've got to say that this was uh too big to have been done by anybody without a state sponsor. must have come from Saddam Hussein.”
The speaker's Canadian intelligence contact called the next day and urged him to attribute the attacks to Saddam Hussein as a state-sponsored operation.
This is a private-call anecdote attributed only to the speaker and an unnamed friend. No independent public evidence was located that can confirm or refute the call or its precise wording.
Sources: none found for this claim.
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Claim 17
“About 10 days after 911, you go into the Pentagon and a general tells you, "We've decided to attack Iraq."”
Wesley Clark was told by a general at the Pentagon about 10 days after September 11, 2001, that the United States had decided to attack Iraq.
This describes a private conversation for which no independent documentary confirmation was found. Clark publicly recounted a similar episode in 2003, but that account described an officer, a hallway joke, and a time frame of “a couple of weeks,” not an independently verified decision by a named general exactly 10 days after September 11.
Sources
- 1Transcript: Wesley Clark↗
Background
I went through the Pentagon right after 9/11, and a guy told me, this was a couple of weeks later, he said, "Have you heard the joke?"
- 1Transcript: Wesley Clark↗
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Claim 18
“She said, "No, they're needed where they're going to fight and that's in the Middle East."”
Condoleezza Rice told Wesley Clark in the summer of 2000 that U.S. troops should be moved to the Middle East because that was where they would fight.
The transcript presents Clark's recollection of a private 2000 conversation. No reliable independent source located for this fact-check corroborates that Rice made this statement, so the attribution and wording cannot be confirmed or refuted.
Sources: none found for this claim.
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Claim 19
“there was this, um, presumption that they would be going to war again in the Middle East to finish the job against Saddam Hussein.”
There was a presumption that the United States would go to war again in the Middle East to finish the job against Saddam Hussein.
This is a claim about an internal presumption held by unspecified people. Public records show that Iraq was discussed and planned for as a possible contingency, but they do not establish the breadth of the alleged presumption or that its purpose was specifically to “finish the job.”
Sources
- 11996 National Security Strategy↗
Background
The focus of our planning for major theater conflict is on deterring and, if necessary, fighting and defeating aggression by potentially hostile regional powers, such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq.
- 2Transcript: Wesley Clark↗
Background
There had been a decision made that we were going to get Saddam Hussein, and this was apparently made at least, not a final decision, but a decision to move very forcefully in that direction.
- 11996 National Security Strategy↗
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Claim 20
“In um in 1997 in the Pentagon, we moved from the Pentagon planning document of two major regional nearly simultaneous conflicts, namely Iraq and Korea as force planning goals to two major theaters of war.”
In 1997, Pentagon planning changed from the two-major-regional-conflicts framework to a two-major-theater-wars framework, with Korea and Iraq or Iran as the principal scenarios.
Contemporary defense materials document a two-nearly-simultaneous-major-regional-conflict framework involving Korea and the Persian Gulf, and a 1997 account records that the terminology changed from two MRCs to two major theater wars. Official strategy documents also identify North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as relevant regional contingencies.
Checked twice, independently: the first pass returned Accurate and the second False. Recorded as Unverifiable.
Sources
- 1Civil Military Affairs and U.S. Diplomacy: The Changing Roles of the Regional Commanders-In-Chief↗
Supports
They changed the name from two MRCs to two major theater wars (MTWs.)
- 2Part I Defending the Nation: 1996 Department of Defense Annual Report↗
Supports
The United States’ strategy of engagement and enlargement requires forces that are able, in concert with regional allies, to fight and win two major regional conflicts (MRCs) that occur nearly simultaneously.
- 31996 National Security Strategy↗
Supports
The focus of our planning for major theater conflict is on deterring and, if necessary, fighting and defeating aggression by potentially hostile regional powers, such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq.
- 1Civil Military Affairs and U.S. Diplomacy: The Changing Roles of the Regional Commanders-In-Chief↗
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Claim 21
“But all the planning in the Pentagon was set up for that scenario. So, so it was just a natural thing that uh when 9/11 happened, uh everything was moving in that direction.”
Pentagon planning was set up for a Middle Eastern war, and the September 11 attacks caused everything to move in that direction.
The Pentagon did maintain two-theater-war planning centered on Korea and the Persian Gulf, but the assertion that all Pentagon planning was directed toward Iraq and that 9/11 therefore caused everything to move in that direction is too broad to establish from the available records.
Checked twice, independently: the first pass returned Misleading and the second Unverifiable. Recorded as Unverifiable.
Sources
- 1The Quadrennial Defense Review: Congressional Hearing↗
Background
The assumption of the Bottom-Up Review is that we will fight two major wars reasonably simultaneously and win them quickly.
- 2The Quadrennial Defense Review, 1996–1997↗
Background
The first QDR followed this same model to examine the current conditions of national security and prepare for future challenges and opportunities.
- 1The Quadrennial Defense Review: Congressional Hearing↗
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Claim 22
“This is a memo that describes how we're going to take out seven countries in 5 years, starting with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon Libya Somalia Sudan and finishing off Iran.”
A classified memo from the Secretary of Defense's office described taking out seven countries in five years, beginning with Iraq and ending with Iran.
Wesley Clark publicly recounted this alleged memo, but the memo itself has not been produced and no independent source verifies that it existed or represented an official seven-country plan.
Sources
- 1Gen. Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid↗
Background
This is a memo that describes how we’re going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran.
- 1Gen. Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid↗
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Claim 23
“we've got uh just five or 10 years to take out these old Soviet surrogate regimes until the next uh great uh uh empire comes on to take over middle the Middle East.”
In May 1991, Paul Wolfowitz sketched a concept of removing old Soviet-aligned regimes in the Middle East within five or ten years.
This is Clark's recollection of a private conversation. No independent documentary source located here confirms that Wolfowitz made this proposal in May 1991 with the stated timetable and objective.
Sources
- 1Gen. Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid↗
Background
He said, we got five or ten years to clean up these old Soviet surrogate states like Iraq and Syria before the next big super power comes along.
- 1Gen. Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid↗
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Claim 24
“I later found out that they had actually drawn up a strategy like this, taken it to um General Skraftoft, who was n national security adviser for President George HW Bush. And uh Skraftoft had said, "Yeah, okay." But uh let's wait until the president's reelected before we bring this to him.”
The alleged strategy was taken to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who approved it but advised waiting until President George H.W. Bush was reelected before presenting it to him.
The account is attributed to Clark's later recollection, and the alleged strategy document and Scowcroft discussion have not been independently substantiated by the sources located.
Checked twice, independently: the first pass returned Unverifiable and the second Accurate. Recorded as Unverifiable.
Sources
- 1Gen. Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid↗
Background
And he said, “Sir, I didn’t show you that memo! I didn’t show it to you!”
- 1Gen. Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid↗
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Claim 25
“And so President Bush wasn't reelected”
George H.W. Bush was not reelected president in 1992.
The National Archives records Bill Clinton as the winner of the 1992 presidential election and George Bush as the main opponent, confirming that Bush lost his reelection bid.
Sources
- 11992 Electoral College Results↗
Supports
Winner: 370
- 2George H. W. Bush↗
Supports
In 1992 he lost his bid for reelection to Democrat William Clinton.
- 11992 Electoral College Results↗
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Claim 26
“Paul Wolfitz, of course, was deputy defense secretary in 2001 in the Bush administration.”
Paul Wolfowitz was deputy secretary of defense in the George W. Bush administration in 2001.
Official biographies record Wolfowitz as deputy secretary of defense from 2001 to 2005, including the period described.
Sources
- 1Paul Dundes Wolfowitz↗
Supports
Deputy Secretary of Defense (2001-2005).
- 2Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz↗
Supports
On February 5, 2001, President Bush announced his intention to nominate Dr.
- 1Paul Dundes Wolfowitz↗
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Claim 27
“obviously that didn't happen. They didn't attack seven countries in five years.”
The United States did not attack all seven listed countries within five years.
The Congressional Research Service chronology places U.S. combat operations in several of the listed countries in different years, including Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011, and Iraq and Syria in 2014; this is not seven listed countries attacked within a single five-year period after 2001.
Sources
- 1Middle East: An Overview↗
Supports
invaded Iraq in 2003, participated in the bombing of Libya in 2011, initiated a bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria in 2014, and joined military efforts in Yemen in 2015.
- 1Middle East: An Overview↗
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Claim 28
“over the past 25 years has attacked five of those seven countries”
Over the preceding 25 years, the United States had attacked five of the seven listed countries.
Official histories document U.S. military action in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Somalia, and Sudan, but the relevant actions occurred across different periods and were not a single seven-country campaign. Counting five within a literal 25-year window is ambiguous because Sudan's documented strike was in 1998, outside a 2001–2026 window.
Omits: The statement does not specify what counts as an attack or account for the dates of the operations: the well-documented U.S. strike on Sudan occurred in 1998, while major operations in Iraq, Libya, and Syria occurred in 2003, 2011, and 2014 respectively. Thus the apparent count depends on a broad and date-sensitive definition rather than a demonstrated five-country sequence.
The intensifier "over the past 25 years" is judged literally as a rolling period ending in 2026; under a looser period beginning in 1992, the count can reach five by including the 1998 Sudan strike.
Sources
- 1U.S. Strikes Out Against Terrorism↗
Background
using its military forces to strike targets in Afghanistan and Sudan linked to the terrorist group that allegedly directed the embassy attacks and was planning others.
- 2Middle East: An Overview↗
Background
invaded Iraq in 2003, participated in the bombing of Libya in 2011, initiated a bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria in 2014, and joined military efforts in Yemen in 2015.
- 3Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Statement on U.S. Africa Command Strikes in Somalia↗
Background
This action further degrades ISIS's ability to plot and conduct terrorist attacks threatening U.S. citizens, our partners, and innocent civilians
- 1U.S. Strikes Out Against Terrorism↗
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Claim 29
“is in fact currently attacking the final name on that list, the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
The United States is currently attacking Iran.
The United States did carry out military operations in Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and Syria during the period, and U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran began on February 28, 2026. But treating Iran as an additional sixth country, as the wording implies, overstates the count; Sudan and Lebanon fall outside the stated 25-year window for the cited attacks.
Omits: The claim does not clarify whether Iran is included in the count of five. From 2001 through 2026, the documented countries in the list with U.S. military attacks before the current Iran conflict are Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and Syria; Sudan's cited U.S. bombing was in 1998 and Lebanon's major U.S. intervention was in 1982-1983, outside that 25-year window.
The phrase "attacked five" was judged as a count separate from the subsequently mentioned current attack on Iran. If Iran is included in the count, five listed countries have been attacked during the period; if it is excluded, only four are clearly documented before the Iran conflict.
Checked twice, independently: the first pass returned Accurate and the second Misleading. Recorded as Misleading.
Sources
- 1Most of the U.S. military engagements over the past 30 years have been in the Middle East↗
Supports
The United States supported the Afghan rebels fighting against Soviet invaders in the 1980s, sent troops into Lebanon in 1982 and 1983, bombed Libya in 1986, deployed American naval forces and took military action against Iran in 1987, drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait in 1991 and imposed no-fly zones on Iraq, deployed American forces to Somalia in 1992 and 1993, bombed Iraq in 1993 and Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, invaded Afghanistan in 2001, invaded Iraq in 2003, participated in the bombing of Libya in 2011, initiated a bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria in 2014, and joined military efforts in Yemen in 2015.
- 2U.S. Conflict with Iran↗
Supports
On February 28, 2026, U.S. and Israeli forces began striking targets in Iran, initiating Operation Epic Fury (United States) and Operation Roaring Lion (Israel).
- 1Most of the U.S. military engagements over the past 30 years have been in the Middle East↗
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Claim 30
“Secretary Rumsfeld saying really wasn't an insurgency at that point, just a bunch of outings in the street.”
Donald Rumsfeld said that the violence in Iraq was not an insurgency at that point.
Contemporary reporting confirms that Rumsfeld rejected describing the Iraqi opposition as an insurgency, but the transcript's phrase "a bunch of outings in the street" is unclear and cannot be verified as an actual Rumsfeld statement.
Sources
- 1Bush Defends Embattled War Policy↗
Supports
Rumsfeld also said he disagrees with calling the enemy in Iraq part of an "insurgency" because they don't have a legitimate gripe.
- 2Interviews - Michael Gordon | The Lost Year In Iraq↗
Background
Again, it's the American military that comes out, and it's John Abizaid in July of 2003 who dares to use the word "insurgency" and who kind of breaks the news to the nation about what's going on in Iraq goes well beyond what the Defense Department civilians are willing to admit.
- 1Bush Defends Embattled War Policy↗
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Claim 31
“When we did Kosovo in 1999, we had NATO behind us.”
NATO supported the United States during the 1999 Kosovo campaign.
The Kosovo air campaign was conducted as a NATO operation, with the Alliance providing the institutional and military framework for the intervention.
Sources
- 11999 - Operation Allied Force↗
Supports
During the 78-day campaign, sorties peaked in late May and early June.
- 2Kosovo Air Campaign, March-June 1999↗
Supports
La campagne aérienne de l'OTAN au Kosovo a commencé le 24 mars 1999.
- 11999 - Operation Allied Force↗
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Claim 32
“we had the majority of the assets that did the strikes in Kosovo.”
The United States supplied the majority of the assets used for the Kosovo strikes.
NATO stated that the United States provided approximately 70% of the air assets for the Kosovo air campaign and the lion's share of its sophisticated aircraft and weaponry.
Sources
- 1Speaking Notes↗
Supports
The first is that the United States not only provided approximately 70% of the air assets for NATO's Air Campaign, it also provided the lion's share of the sophisticated aircraft and weaponry plus other strategic assets.
- 1Speaking Notes↗
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Claim 33
“Only the French had a precision strike”
Only France among the European participants had a precision-strike capability in Kosovo.
The United Kingdom's parliamentary record lists hundreds of Paveway precision-guided bombs used in Kosovo and identifies British Tomahawk missiles as an attack capability. France therefore was not the only European participant with precision-strike weapons.
The intensifier "Only" was judged literally: the claim says France was the sole European participant with such a capability.
Sources
- 1Kosovo - Hansard↗
Refutes
Kosovo (Op Allied Force) 226—Paveway II 18—Paveway III
- 2House of Commons Defence Committee Report↗
Refutes
HMS Splendid with its TLAM cruise missiles represented the only European unit available to contribute to the attack element of the campaign.
- 1Kosovo - Hansard↗
-
Claim 34
“In 2001, uh NATO wanted to help the United States in Afghanistan. So, >> but the United States said, "No, we're going to handle this ourselves."”
NATO wanted to help the United States in Afghanistan in 2001, but the United States declined and chose to handle the operation itself.
Washington chose a U.S.-led coalition rather than placing the initial combat operation under NATO command, but saying it simply rejected NATO help omits the extensive assistance it accepted. NATO invoked Article 5 and provided or arranged multiple forms of operational support.
Omits: The United States did not use NATO as the main command structure for the initial invasion, but it accepted substantial NATO assistance, including Article 5 support, intelligence, overflight rights, bases, and AWACS patrols.
Sources
- 1NATO and Afghanistan↗
Refutes
12 September 2001: NATO Allies and partner countries condemn the attacks, offering their support to the United States.
- 2Remarks to the press↗
Refutes
The United States did ask NATO for help.
- 3NATO's Response to Terrorism↗
Refutes
Accordingly, we have decided to support, individually and collectively, the ongoing US-led military operations against the terrorists who perpetrated the 11 September outrages and those who provide them sanctuary.
- 1NATO and Afghanistan↗
-
Claim 35
“You didn't support Iraq, but you did support the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 2001.”
The interviewee supported the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and argued that Taliban power had to be broken.
The cited contemporary interview identifies Wesley Clark as the guest and records him saying that Taliban power had to be broken. His later Washington Post article also defended the continuing U.S. presence in Afghanistan as serving a vital interest against al-Qaeda and similar groups.
Sources
- 1Interview With Wesley Clark↗
Supports
The Taliban power has to be broken.
- 2Gen. Wesley Clark says Libya doesn’t meet the test for U.S. military action↗
Supports
And we're still there, despite all the ambiguities and difficulties, because we have a vital interest in combating al-Qaeda and similar terrorist groups there and across the border in Pakistan.
- 1Interview With Wesley Clark↗
-
Claim 36
“The United States enters Afghanistan in 2001, leaves in 2021”
The United States entered Afghanistan in 2001 and left in 2021.
The U.S.-led military campaign began on October 7, 2001, and the U.S. embassy and military presence were withdrawn in 2021, with the embassy suspending operations on August 31, 2021.
Sources
- 1Afghanistan - Office of the Historian↗
Supports
the United States and its coalition partners began a military campaign on October 7, 2001
- 2Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy↗
Supports
In 2021, U.S. and international forces withdrew from Afghanistan after nearly two decades
- 3Afghanistan - Office of the Historian↗
Supports
The U.S. Embassy in Kabul suspended operations on August 31, 2021 and transferred operations to Doha, Qatar.
- 1Afghanistan - Office of the Historian↗
-
Claim 37
“We arrived with the Taliban in power. We leave with the Taliban in power.”
The Taliban were in power when the United States entered Afghanistan and when it left.
The Taliban ruled Afghanistan when the U.S. campaign began in October 2001; they were removed from national power during the campaign but retook power after the 2021 withdrawal.
Sources
- 1Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy↗
Supports
the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist group that formerly ruled the country from 1996 to 2001, retook power.
- 2Afghanistan - Office of the Historian↗
Supports
Kabul fell on November 13, 2001.
- 3U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan↗
Supports
On the morning of August 15, 2021, the Taliban entered Kabul, completing their effective takeover of the country.
- 1Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy↗
-
Claim 38
“America's longest war”
The Afghanistan war was America's longest war.
The U.S. Secretary of State described the Afghanistan conflict as America’s longest war in congressional testimony, a characterization consistent with its nearly two-decade duration.
Sources
- 1AFGHANISTAN 2001–2021↗
Supports
it was time to end America’s longest war.
- 1AFGHANISTAN 2001–2021↗
-
Claim 39
“we went into Afghanistan without a clear plan to get Osama bin Laden.”
The United States entered Afghanistan without a clear plan for capturing Osama bin Laden.
The statement concerns whether U.S. decision-makers had a sufficiently clear internal plan, but “clear plan” is undefined and cannot be established from public records alone. Official U.S. descriptions identified disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and eliminating safe havens as strategic goals, but that does not prove or disprove the speaker’s characterization of the plan’s clarity.
Sources
- 1Afghanistan and Pakistan: Oversight of U.S. Interagency Efforts↗
Background
In March, the President announced a strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a broad strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; destroying its allies and safe havens in Pakistan; and preventing their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.
- 1Afghanistan and Pakistan: Oversight of U.S. Interagency Efforts↗
-
Claim 40
“We were unable to close the border.”
The United States failed to prevent militant safe havens and cross-border attacks from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
U.S. Government Accountability Office reports found that the United States had not met its goal of closing terrorist safe havens in Pakistan and that the border region remained a base for attacks into Afghanistan. This supports the substantive claim in the operational sense used in the transcript.
I judged “close the border” in its operational sense—preventing militant sanctuary and cross-border operations—not as a literal claim that the international frontier could be physically sealed.
Sources
- 1Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts to Address the Terrorist Threat in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Require a Comprehensive Plan and Continued Oversight↗
Supports
The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan's FATA.
- 2Combating Terrorism: Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development Assistance in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to Be Improved↗
Supports
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has been a recognized safe haven for al Qaeda leadership and a base for the Taliban to launch cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.
- 1Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts to Address the Terrorist Threat in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Require a Comprehensive Plan and Continued Oversight↗
-
Claim 41
“The decisions were made that pulled support away from the Afghan National Army. We not only reduced the US presence there, we reduced what the US forces were doing there, leaving the Afghan National Army on its own.”
During the Trump administration, U.S. decisions reduced American military support and activity in Afghanistan, leaving Afghan forces with substantially less support.
SIGAR found that U.S. military support to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces changed dramatically after the Doha agreement, including a 78% fall in airstrikes and loss of close air support. However, “leaving the Afghan National Army on its own” creates the stronger impression that all support ended, which is not supported by the record.
Omits: The statement omits that the United States continued funding and other forms of assistance to the Afghan security forces; the major documented change was a sharp reduction in airstrikes and close air support after the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, not the complete abandonment of the Afghan army.
Sources
- 1Statement of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John F. Sopko before the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability↗
Supports
But after the signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the U.S. military changed its level of military support to the ANDSF dramatically.
- 2Statement of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John F. Sopko before the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability↗
Supports
The loss of U.S. close air support allowed the Taliban to mass its forces in the open and to infiltrate and surround major cities across Afghanistan.
- 3Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy↗
Background
The February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement on U.S. troop withdrawals and Taliban counterterrorism assurances.
- 1Statement of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John F. Sopko before the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability↗
-
Claim 42
“And so we had exactly the same outcome.”
The Afghanistan outcome was exactly the same as the outcome of the Vietnam War.
“Exactly the same outcome” has no agreed operational definition. Although both conflicts ended with the collapse or defeat of a U.S.-backed government after U.S. disengagement, the claim’s exact equivalence cannot be tested without specifying which political, military, and humanitarian outcomes are being compared.
Sources: none found for this claim.
-
Claim 43
“Over 940,000 people were killed in post 911 wars, occupations, drone strikes between 2001 and 2023.”
More than 940,000 people were killed directly in post-9/11 wars between 2001 and 2023.
Brown University’s Costs of War project estimated that more than 940,000 people were killed by direct post-9/11 war violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan between 2001 and 2023. The project’s wording is “direct war violence,” while the transcript additionally describes the conflicts as occupations and drone strikes.
Sources
- 1Human Costs↗
Supports
An estimated over 940,000 people were killed by direct post-9/11 war violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan between 2001-2023.
- 1Human Costs↗
-
Claim 44
“Half of those people almost were civilians”
Nearly half of those direct deaths were civilians.
Brown’s estimate says that more than 432,000 of the over 940,000 direct deaths were civilians, which is approximately 46%—close to half.
Sources
- 1Human Costs↗
Supports
Of these, more than 432,000 were civilians.
- 1Human Costs↗
-
Claim 45
“around 3.6 Six million people died indirectly from all sorts of health and public health issues and infrastructure problems.”
Approximately 3.6 million people died indirectly from the post-9/11 wars through health, public-health, infrastructure, and related effects.
Brown’s Costs of War project estimates 3.6–3.8 million indirect deaths in post-9/11 war zones, attributing them to the destruction of economies, public services, healthcare systems, infrastructure, and the environment. The transcript’s figure of around 3.6 million is within that estimate.
Sources
- 1Human Costs↗
Supports
An estimated 3.6-3.8 million people died indirectly in post-9/11 war zones, bringing the total death toll to at least 4.5-4.7 million and counting.
- 2How Death Outlives War: The Reverberating Impact of the Post-9/11 Wars on Human Health↗
Supports
Some people were killed in the fighting, but far more, especially children, have been killed by the reverberating effects of war, such as the spread of disease.
- 1Human Costs↗
-
Claim 46
“the outrageous murder of 3,000 Americans”
The September 11 attacks killed about 3,000 Americans.
The approximate number is close to the official death toll, but calling all approximately 3,000 victims “Americans” is inaccurate. The 9/11 Memorial records 2,977 victims from 90 nations.
Omits: The attacks killed 2,977 people from 90 nations, so the victims were not all Americans; the statement also rounds the exact death toll to 3,000.
Sources
- 19/11 FAQs↗
Refutes
The attacks killed 2,977 people from 90 nations: 2,753 people were killed in New York; 184 people were killed at the Pentagon; and 40 people were killed on Flight 93.
- 19/11 FAQs↗
-
Claim 47
“what Osama bin Laden wanted to precipitate was conflict.”
Osama bin Laden wanted to precipitate conflict.
The 9/11 Commission reported that bin Laden believed an attack on the United States could draw Americans into war and benefit al-Qaeda. That supports the speaker’s narrower claim that conflict was an intended outcome.
Sources
- 1The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 7↗
Supports
It might draw the Americans into the war against them, just when final victory seemed within their grasp.
- 2The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 7↗
Supports
Beyond these rhetorical appeals, Bin Ladin also reportedly thought an attack against the United States would benefit al Qaeda by attracting more suicide operatives, eliciting greater donations, and increasing the number of sympathizers willing to provide logistical assistance.
- 1The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 7↗
-
Claim 48
“You had Hamas that knew that if they struck out at Israel, they could expect an incredible reaction.”
Hamas knew that attacking Israel would provoke a major Israeli reaction.
Available reporting based on intelligence officials and Hamas statements indicates that Hamas expected a severe or overwhelming Israeli response to the October 7 attack. The source supports the claim’s assertion of anticipated retaliation, though not necessarily every implication of the broader analogy to bin Laden.
Sources
- 1Hamas envisioned deeper attacks, aiming to provoke an Israeli war↗
Supports
The evidence, described by more than a dozen current and former intelligence and security officials from four Western and Middle Eastern countries, reveals an intention by Hamas planners to strike a blow of historic proportions, in the expectation that the group’s actions would compel an overwhelming Israeli response.
- 2Hamas envisioned deeper attacks, aiming to provoke an Israeli war↗
Supports
“We knew there was going to be a violent reaction,” Naim said.
- 1Hamas envisioned deeper attacks, aiming to provoke an Israeli war↗
-
Claim 49
“There are no professional strategists that work elsewhere in the US government on that that have command of resources, planned scenarios and stuff.”
There are no professional strategists working elsewhere in the U.S. government.
The categorical claim that no professional strategists work elsewhere in the U.S. government is contradicted by the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and the National Security Council, both of which have formal strategic-planning roles. The additional phrase about commanding resources is not enough to rescue the universal claim as stated.
Sources
- 1About Us – Policy Planning Staff↗
Refutes
The Policy Planning Staff”s mission is to take a longer term, strategic view of global trends and frame recommendations for the Secretary of State to advance U.S. interests and American values.
- 2Organization of the National Security Council and Subcommittees↗
Refutes
Along with its subordinate committees and staff, the NSC shall be the President’s principal means for coordinating Executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national and homeland security policies, strategies, activities, and functions, their integration across departments and agencies within their purview, and for long-term strategic planning.
- 1About Us – Policy Planning Staff↗
-
Claim 50
Donald Trump went to war in Iran without a clear strategic objective.
The existence of the Iran war is documented, and reporting describes Trump’s stated aims as shifting over time. However, “without a clear strategic objective” is not operationally defined, so the claim’s decisive qualifier cannot be objectively confirmed or refuted from available evidence.
Checked twice, independently: the first pass returned Unverifiable and the second Accurate. Recorded as Unverifiable.
Sources
- 1Iran war has cost the US more than $38B, budget office says↗
Background
WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.S. war against Iran has cost the Department of Defense more than $38 billion through Aug. 1, and will continue costing up to $3 billion a month or more depending on the intensity of the conflict, according to an assessment released Tuesday by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office.
- 2US goals have shifted after 6 months of Iran war. The Strait of Hormuz is now a top concern↗
Background
One of the prime goals now - reopening the Strait of Hormuz - was not one of Trump's original objectives.
- 1Iran war has cost the US more than $38B, budget office says↗
-
Claim 51
“He's now reduced to begging the Iranians to keep the straight of Hormuz open.”
Trump was seeking to get Iran to keep or reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
The administration was seeking to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, but the specific framing that Trump was begging the Iranians is misleading. Reporting described demands directed at other countries to provide naval support, while Iran was the party whose control of the Strait was being challenged.
Omits: The account omits that Trump publicly demanded that about seven other countries send warships to keep the Strait open; the reporting does not describe him as begging Iran, and instead describes the United States and Iran as opposing parties in the conflict over the waterway.
Checked twice, independently: the first pass returned Accurate and the second Misleading. Recorded as Misleading.
Sources
- 1Trump says that he's asked 'about 7' countries to join coalition to police Iran's Strait of Hormuz↗
Refutes
President Donald Trump said Sunday that he has demanded about seven countries send warships to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, but his appeals have brought no commitments as oil prices soar during the Iran war.
- 2US military says it destroyed 2 small Iranian boats trying to steal a sea drone↗
Background
Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Tuesday called the foreign minister of Oman to discuss the Gulf Arab country's efforts to deescalate tensions and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the State Department said.
- 1Trump says that he's asked 'about 7' countries to join coalition to police Iran's Strait of Hormuz↗
-
Claim 52
“So, right now we're in an active conflict and um yes, I want the United States to succeed.”
The United States is currently in an active conflict with Iran.
The Congressional Research Service describes ongoing U.S.-Iran hostilities and says that, as of September 2026, the conflict had become a war of attrition.
Sources
- 1U.S. Conflict with Iran↗
Supports
As of September 2026, the conflict appears to have become a war of attrition.
- 1U.S. Conflict with Iran↗
-
Claim 53
“They haven't had that choice.”
The Iranian people have not had a choice in their form of government.
Iranian citizens have some electoral choices, but those elections do not meet international democratic standards and do not allow voters to choose the country's fundamental theocratic system. The absolute wording leaves out this distinction.
Omits: Iran does hold elections for the presidency and parliament, although the unelected Guardian Council restricts candidate eligibility and the Supreme Leader and related institutions retain ultimate power.
Sources
- 1Iran: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report↗
Background
The Islamic Republic of Iran holds elections regularly, but they fall short of democratic standards due in part to the influence of the hard-line Guardian Council, an unelected body that disqualifies all candidates it deems insufficiently loyal to the clerical establishment.
- 2Iran: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report↗
Background
Ultimate power rests in the hands of the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the unelected institutions under his control.
- 1Iran: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report↗
-
Claim 54
“I'm saying that that was one of the stated goals,”
Regime change was one of the stated goals of the U.S. war against Iran.
Contemporary reporting documented that regime change was among the Trump administration's publicly expressed rationales, even though officials also presented other goals and later denied that it was the formal military objective.
Sources
- 1White House rationale for war keeps shifting↗
Supports
The president and his top aides have offered varying justifications for attacking Iran — from regime change to preemption to eliminating its nuclear program and ballistic missiles.
- 1White House rationale for war keeps shifting↗
-
Claim 55
“We began the war on February 28th,”
The U.S.-Iran war began on February 28, 2026.
The Congressional Research Service dates the beginning of U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, which initiated the conflict, to February 28, 2026.
Sources
- 1U.S. Conflict with Iran↗
Supports
On February 28, 2026, U.S. and Israeli forces began striking targets in Iran, initiating Operation Epic Fury (United States) and Operation Roaring Lion (Israel).
- 1U.S. Conflict with Iran↗
-
Claim 56
“We began the war on February 28th, massacring over 160 children in a school in Minab.”
The February 28 attack on a school in Minab killed more than 160 children.
The Minab school strike and a very large child death toll are well documented, but the specific claim of more than 160 children killed is not settled. A local-authority breakdown reported 120 student deaths, while other accounts reported higher but differing figures, and attribution of deliberate intent remained under investigation.
Omits: The casualty count and the number of children killed were disputed: local-authority reporting cited 120 students among 156 deaths, while other Iranian and UN-linked accounts gave higher figures; available reporting does not establish the speaker's precise figure as settled fact.
Sources
- 1Iranians recount attempts to find survivors after school bombing↗
Background
Among the dead were 120 students, 26 teachers and several parents who had rushed to the school to retrieve their children after hearing reports of airstrikes on Tehran.
- 2UN experts say US strikes in Iran may constitute war crimes↗
Background
Iranian state media have said 168 people were killed in the strike, most of them children.
- 3US/Israel: Investigate Iran School Attack as a War Crime↗
Background
As of March 4, the death toll from this attack had risen to 168, Iranian state media reported.
- 1Iranians recount attempts to find survivors after school bombing↗
-
Claim 57
“Last week, we bombed a wedding celebration in southern Iran, killing four civilians, injuring dozens more.”
A U.S. strike on a wedding celebration in southern Iran killed four civilians and injured dozens more.
Contemporary reporting said that a strike on a home hosting a wedding in southern Iran killed four people and wounded at least 68, although responsibility and the precise casualty total were still being investigated.
Sources
- 1What to know about a reported US airstrike that hit a wedding in Iran↗
Supports
The IRNA and state TV said two women and two children, aged 4 and 16, were killed, and at least 68 were wounded.
- 2Deadly Iran wedding strike likely due to U.S. bomb missing a nearby target↗
Supports
The strike on the home, which Iranian officials said killed at least four civilians and injured dozens more, was part of a larger wave of attacks on Tuesday in southern Iran, described by U.S. officials as retaliation for increased threats to U.S. troops and commercial shipping.
- 1What to know about a reported US airstrike that hit a wedding in Iran↗
-
Claim 58
“But we do know that we killed we killed60 children.”
U.S. forces killed 60 children in an unspecified incident.
The transcript does not identify the incident, location, date, or operation referred to by “we,” so the numerical claim cannot be matched reliably to a specific documented event.
Sources: none found for this claim.
-
Claim 59
“somewhere between 30 40 I've heard as high as 90,000 people.”
An unspecified number of people killed in the relevant incident was estimated at between 30 and 40, with some reports as high as 90,000.
The statement is fragmentary and omits the unit, the identity of the victims, the time period, and the incident being discussed. Without those details, the reported range cannot be evaluated against a defined factual claim.
Sources: none found for this claim.
-
Claim 60
“I think there's a profound moral distinction and a legal distinction in international law and in any uh laws of human nature, mankind or any moral philosophy of any uh religion between killing innocents by accident and deliberately killing non-combatants of your own people.”
International law distinguishes accidental civilian deaths from deliberate killings of non-combatants.
International humanitarian law prohibits deliberately targeting civilians while permitting some incidental civilian casualties when attacks comply with distinction, proportionality, and precaution requirements. The legal distinction exists, although accidental civilian deaths are not automatically lawful in every circumstance.
Sources
- 1International law on the conduct of hostilities: overview↗
Supports
Deliberately targeting civilians is a war crime.
- 2Methods and means of warfare↗
Supports
Proportionality means that the so-called “incidental loss” of civilian life or property should not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
- 1International law on the conduct of hostilities: overview↗
-
Claim 61
“I'd like to see an Iran in which the people of Iran have a choice in their government. They don't have that choice right now.”
Iranian citizens do not currently have a meaningful choice in selecting their government.
The statement is misleading because it can imply that Iranians have no electoral choice at all. Reliable assessments describe regular elections but say candidate vetting and the authority of unelected institutions make the choices highly restricted and non-democratic by international standards.
Omits: Iran holds elections and citizens can vote, but unelected institutions vet candidates and the supreme leader and other unelected bodies retain ultimate power, sharply limiting the available choice.
Checked twice, independently: the first pass returned Misleading and the second Accurate. Recorded as Misleading.
Sources
- 1Iran: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report↗
Background
The Islamic Republic of Iran holds elections regularly, but they fall short of democratic standards due in part to the influence of the hard-line Guardian Council, an unelected body that disqualifies all candidates it deems insufficiently loyal to the clerical establishment.
- 22023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iran↗
Refutes
The constitution provides citizens the ability to choose the president, as well as members of the Assembly of Experts and parliament, provided all have been vetted and approved by the Guardian Council.
- 32023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iran↗
Supports
Candidate vetting conducted by unelected bodies, however, abridged this right in all instances.
- 1Iran: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report↗
-
Claim 62
“despite NATO wanting to be helpful and sending some troops over to Afghanistan and some NATO troops in Iraq”
NATO sent forces to Afghanistan and Iraq after the September 11 attacks and the Iraq war.
NATO led or participated in missions in Afghanistan and conducted a training mission in Iraq, so the factual assertion that NATO troops were sent to both countries is supported. The phrase that NATO was 'wanting to be helpful' is evaluative, but the deployment claim is factual.
Sources
- 1NATO and Afghanistan↗
Supports
ISAF was one of the largest coalitions in history and NATO’s longest and most challenging mission to date.
- 2Operations and missions↗
Supports
NATO’s past operations and missions have included a variety of peace-support activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.
- 1NATO and Afghanistan↗
-
Claim 63
“So when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008,”
Russia invaded Georgia in 2008.
Contemporary United Nations materials describe Russian ground forces entering Georgia during the August 2008 conflict. The conflict's immediate origins and responsibility for initiating hostilities are disputed in some accounts, but the claim that Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 is supported.
Sources
- 1Principal facts: Georgia v. Russia↗
Supports
From 8 August 2008 Russian ground forces penetrated into Georgia by crossing through Abkhazia and South Ossetia before entering the neighbouring regions in undisputed Georgian territory.
- 1Principal facts: Georgia v. Russia↗
-
Claim 64
“Sarco went over and they got a ceasefire.”
Nicolas Sarkozy mediated a ceasefire in the 2008 Georgia war.
The United Nations credited French President Nicolas Sarkozy with mediating the six-point ceasefire plan accepted by Georgia and Russia in August 2008.
Sources
- 1Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on the situation in Georgia↗
Supports
The Secretary-General welcomes the acceptance by Georgia and by the Russian Federation of the peace plan proposed by President Sarkozy of France.
- 2United Nations report on the situation in Georgia↗
Supports
On August 12, French President Nicolas Sarkozy successfully mediated a 6-point ceasefire plan between the Georgian and Russian presidents.
- 1Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on the situation in Georgia↗
-
Claim 65
“But Russia still has a quarter of Georgia in 2013”
Russia still controlled approximately one-quarter of Georgia in 2013.
The occupation figure commonly cited in official and international sources was about 20 percent of Georgia's territory, not 25 percent. The claim therefore overstates the share by roughly five percentage points.
Sources
- 1Annex to the identical letters dated 9 August 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia↗
Refutes
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation remain in Georgia and occupy 20 per cent of the country’s territory.
- 2Georgia’s EU accession process frozen in wake of 'foreign influence' law↗
Refutes
Moscow's troops have occupied 20% of Georgia's territory since the 2008 war with Russia.
- 1Annex to the identical letters dated 9 August 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia↗
-
Claim 66
“the government fell in in Ukraine and new people came in. Russia decided to seize Crimea and invade Donbos.”
After the Ukrainian government fell and a new government came to power, Russia seized Crimea and invaded the Donbas.
The Ukrainian government collapsed in February 2014 and a new government was formed. Russia then seized Crimea and supported and directed armed action in the Donbas, including direct Russian military involvement.
Sources
- 1Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy↗
Supports
After a failed effort to violently disperse pro-European Union protests, the government of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych collapsed on February 21, 2014. The Ukrainian parliament approved a new pro-reform, pro-Western government on February 27.
- 2Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy↗
Supports
Russia has condemned the new government in Kyiv as illegitimate and responded by sending troops to seize Ukraine’s Crimea region.
- 3Ukraine-Russia relations↗
Supports
Putin then immediately moved to strike in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.
- 1Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy↗
-
Claim 67
“But we killed people in that school.”
U.S. forces killed people at a school in Iran during the war.
The Associated Press reported that at least one U.S. missile hit the Shajareh Tayyebeh school in Minab and that children and teachers were killed. The U.S. government had not formally accepted responsibility at the time of the cited report, but the evidence supports U.S. involvement.
Sources
- 1Families grieve in the ruins of an Iranian school where a US strike killed dozens of children↗
Supports
At least one U.S. missile hit the school that morning in Minab, according to an Associated Press investigation, but there has been no final accounting of what happened.
- 2As the Pentagon stays quiet, AP reconstructs a US strike that killed over 100 Iranian children↗
Supports
On the first day of the war with Iran, after the United States and Israel launched their strikes, footage emerged of what looked to be a bombed Iranian school, and state media reported the deaths of 150 students.
- 1Families grieve in the ruins of an Iranian school where a US strike killed dozens of children↗
-
Claim 68
“There was no UN resolution. No act of self-defense that justified it. No act of Congress. It's a completely illegal war.”
The U.S. war with Iran had no U.N. authorization, no valid self-defense justification, and no act of Congress authorizing it, making it completely illegal.
The record supports the absence of a Security Council authorization and congressional authorization, while the legality of the use of force is an unresolved legal dispute. The U.S. government claimed Article 51 self-defense, whereas U.N. officials and legal scholars rejected that justification.
Concluded by UN Secretary-General António Guterres and international-law scholar Marieke de Hoon, quoted by the Associated Press, concluded that the strikes violated international law and lacked both a self-defense justification and a Security Council resolution.Rejected or unresolved by The U.S. government, through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, asserted that the operation was undertaken in exercise of the United States’ inherent right of self-defense under Article 51.
Sources
- 1Letter dated 10 March 2026 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations↗
Refutes
The United States is taking these necessary and proportionate actions in exercise of the inherent right of self-defense as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
- 2International legal order tested by war in Iran↗
Supports
It is a violation of the prohibition to use force, the cornerstone of the international legal order, and there is no legal justification for it: it is not a self-defense against an armed attack by Iran or an imminent threat of an attack, nor is there a UNSC resolution to authorize use of force, she told The Associated Press.
- 3CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE, April 15, 2026↗
Supports
The President has offered no proposal to even authorize the use of force in Iran, nor have Republicans demanded one.
- 1Letter dated 10 March 2026 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations↗
-
Claim 69
“Trump lied about the nuclear threat there, too.”
Donald Trump lied about the Iranian nuclear threat.
Available evidence disputes or fails to substantiate the administration’s portrayal of an imminent Iranian nuclear threat, but the word “lied” asserts that Trump knowingly made a false statement. The available public evidence cannot establish his intent.
Sources
- 1Assessing Trump's Claims on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Capabilities↗
Supports
Arms control experts told us that last year’s bombing set back Iran’s nuclear program and there’s a lack of evidence that the country was rebuilding it.
- 22026 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community↗
Supports
There has been no efforts since then to try to rebuild their enrichment capability.
- 3Peace Through Strength: President Trump Launches Operation Epic Fury to Crush Iranian Regime, End Nuclear Threat↗
Background
President Donald J. Trump authorized Operation Epic Fury — a precise, overwhelming military campaign to eliminate the imminent nuclear threat posed by the Iranian regime.
- 1Assessing Trump's Claims on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Capabilities↗
-
Claim 70
“Because much of the world's stability, progress, economic growth, bringing billions of people out of poverty has been built on a foundation of US international leadership.”
Much of the world’s stability, progress, economic growth, and reduction of poverty was built on a foundation of U.S. international leadership.
The claim uses undefined and highly expansive terms such as “much of the world’s stability” and attributes broad, multi-causal historical outcomes primarily to U.S. international leadership. No agreed measure can determine whether the assertion, as stated, is true or false.
Sources: none found for this claim.
-
Claim 71
“but remember you have Russia and China uh supporting Iran actively and openly defying US sanctions uh and providing military support, technical advice and targeting.”
Russia and China were actively supporting Iran, openly defying U.S. sanctions, and providing military support, technical advice, and targeting assistance.
Available reporting and U.S. government-linked assessments document Russian intelligence support that could help Iran target U.S. forces and Chinese economic, technological, sanctions-evasion, and intelligence support for Iran. The governments do not necessarily acknowledge all of this assistance publicly, but the underlying assertion is supported.
Checked twice, independently: the first pass returned Accurate and the second False. Recorded as Unverifiable.
Sources
- 1Russia has provided Iran with information that can help Tehran strike US military, AP sources say↗
Supports
Russia has provided Iran with information that could help Tehran strike American warships, aircraft and other assets in the region, according to two officials familiar with U.S. intelligence on the matter.
- 2Enabling Iran: A Timeline of China’s Role During and After Operation Epic Fury↗
Supports
China has provided significant economic, technological, and diplomatic support that has helped Iran mitigate international sanctions, sustain oil exports, and acquire dual-use technologies necessary for Iran’s drones, ballistic missiles, and other weapons.
- 3Russia and China veto US proposal for UN experts to keep monitoring sanctions on Iran↗
Supports
Russia and China vetoed a United Nations resolution Thursday that would have authorized U.N. experts to keep monitoring sanctions that were reimposed against Iran last year over its nuclear program.
- 1Russia has provided Iran with information that can help Tehran strike US military, AP sources say↗
-
Claim 72
“opening the straight of Hormuz is now seen as a success because it was obviously open before we started the war.”
The Strait of Hormuz was open before the United States and Israel began military operations against Iran.
Congressional Research Service reporting states that before the February 28, 2026 military operations, ships were transiting the Strait daily and the waterway was open to navigation without constraint.
Sources
- 1The Strait of Hormuz in Brief: Non-Oil Shipments and Effects on U.S. Shippers↗
Supports
Before U.S. and Israeli military operations began against Iran on February 28, 2026, the average number of ships from various countries transiting through the Strait was about 130 each day.
- 2The Strait of Hormuz in Brief: Non-Oil Shipments and Effects on U.S. Shippers↗
Supports
Before the conflict began, the Strait was open to ship navigation without constraint as per long-standing international law.
- 1The Strait of Hormuz in Brief: Non-Oil Shipments and Effects on U.S. Shippers↗
-
Claim 73
“It was listed as a terrorist group by the US government up until 2012.”
The MEK was designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. until 2012.
The State Department revoked the MEK’s Foreign Terrorist Organization designation on September 28, 2012, so the statement is accurate, though it omits the precise date.
Sources
- 1Delisting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq↗
Supports
The Secretary of State has decided, consistent with the law, to revoke the designation of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and its aliases as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
- 1Delisting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq↗
-
Claim 74
“Uh they worked with Saddam Hussein against Iran during the 80s.”
The MEK worked with Saddam Hussein against Iran during the 1980s.
U.S. State Department reporting says Saddam Hussein invited the MEK to Iraq in the late 1980s, after which it operated as a paramilitary organization and conducted attacks into Iran.
Sources
- 1Chapter 8 -- Foreign Terrorist Organizations↗
Supports
Saddam Hussein invited the group to Iraq in the late 1980s, where it reformed as a paramilitary organization and conducted several cross-border forays into Iran.
- 2Microsoft Word: Country Reports on Terrorism 2005↗
Supports
Since the late 1980s, its primary support came from the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein.
- 1Chapter 8 -- Foreign Terrorist Organizations↗
-
Claim 75
“They killed Americans apparently in the 70s.”
The MEK killed Americans in Iran during the 1970s.
The State Department states that the MEK killed U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians working on defense projects in Tehran during the 1970s.
Sources
- 1Chapter 8 -- Foreign Terrorist Organizations↗
Supports
During the 1970s, the MEK killed U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians working on defense projects in Tehran.
- 2Delisting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq↗
Supports
The Department does not overlook or forget the MEK’s past acts of terrorism, including its involvement in the killing of U.S. citizens in Iran in the 1970s.
- 1Chapter 8 -- Foreign Terrorist Organizations↗
-
Claim 76
“General, this is a group that's considered a cult where the husband and wife leaders, the Rajavis, who you've praised, command absolute devotion.”
The MEK is regarded by some analysts and institutions as a cult, and its Rajavi leaders are associated with demands for unquestioning loyalty.
The claim is framed as a characterization rather than an official legal classification. The Council on Foreign Relations reports that many analysts have characterized the MEK as a cult and describes the group as led by Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.
Sources
- 1Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)↗
Supports
Many analysts, including Rubin, have characterized the MEK as a cult, citing the group’s fealty to the Rajavis.
- 2Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)↗
Supports
The MEK has long been led jointly by husband-and-wife team Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.
- 1Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)↗
-
Claim 77
“There's reports that members of the mech have to get divorced, have to be celibate, their children are taken from them.”
Reports say MEK members were required to divorce, remain celibate, and send their children away.
Sources describe MEK leadership imposing divorce and celibacy and report children being sent away from their parents, including abroad during the Gulf War. The wording overgeneralizes those documented practices into a claim about all members and all children.
Omits: The statement omits that these practices are documented as policies associated with the MEK’s ideological revolution and, in the case of children, as separation or evacuation practices affecting particular groups and periods—not necessarily every member or every family.
The phrase “their children are taken from them” was judged as a universal-sounding description; the evidence supports documented child separation but not that every member’s children were taken.
Checked twice, independently: the first pass returned Accurate and the second Misleading. Recorded as Misleading.
Sources
- 1The Arts↗
Supports
As a part of the ‘ideological revolution,’ the Rajavis mandated divorce and celibacy.
- 2‘We, the child soldiers of the People's Mujahedeen of Iran’↗
Supports
In 1991, during the Gulf War triggered by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, several hundred of them were sent away from their parents to Europe, the US and Canada.
- 1The Arts↗
-
Claim 78
“Human rights groups say it's a cult”
Human rights groups say that the MEK is a cult.
The claim does not identify which human rights groups or define “cult.” Reliable sources document allegations of authoritarian and abusive practices, but the cited evidence does not establish a general human-rights-group consensus using that label.
Sources
- 1Iran: Exiled Armed Group Abuses Dissident Members↗
Background
An armed Iranian opposition group in exile, the Mojahedin Khalq Organization, has subjected dissident members to torture and prolonged solitary confinement, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.
- 2Allegation 8: MEK operates as a cult, separatist organization↗
Background
Critics of the MEK, many journalists¹, and some governments² include in their descriptions of the MEK a characterization that it is a “cult” or engages in cult-like behavior.
- 1Iran: Exiled Armed Group Abuses Dissident Members↗
-
Claim 79
“members have been tortured.”
MEK members have been tortured.
Human Rights Watch reported that dissident members of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization were tortured, beaten, and held in prolonged solitary confinement in its Iraqi camps.
Sources
- 1Iran: Exiled Armed Group Abuses Dissident Members↗
Supports
An armed Iranian opposition group in exile, the Mojahedin Khalq Organization, has subjected dissident members to torture and prolonged solitary confinement, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.
- 1Iran: Exiled Armed Group Abuses Dissident Members↗
-
Claim 80
“government said it was a terrorist”
The U.S. government designated the MEK as a terrorist organization.
The U.S. State Department designated the MEK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 1997; that designation was later revoked in 2012.
Sources
- 1Appendix B — Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations↗
Supports
First designated in October 1997.
- 2Chapter 16↗
Background
On September 28, 2012, the State Department announced that Secretary Clinton had made the determination to revoke the designation of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (“MEK”) and its aliases as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under the Immigration and Nationality Act and to delist the MEK as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under E.O.
- 1Appendix B — Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations↗
-
Claim 81
“they did uh drive the truck bomb in that killed 280 Marines in Lebanon”
The Iranian regime drove the 1983 Beirut truck bombing that killed 280 Marines in Lebanon.
The event and Iran-linked attribution are broadly consistent with official historical accounts, but the stated casualty figure and description are wrong: 241 U.S. service members were killed, and they were not all Marines.
Sources
- 1Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations — Lebanon↗
Refutes
On October 23, suicide bombers attacked the barracks of the U.S. and French contingents of the MNF, killing 241 American servicemen.
- 2Significant Terrorist Incidents 1961–2003: A Brief Chronology↗
Background
Embassy in Beirut, April 18, 1983: Sixty-three people, including the CIA’s Middle East director, were killed and 120 were injured in a 400-pound suicide truck-bomb attack on the U.S.
- 1Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations — Lebanon↗
-
Claim 82
“and also blew up the French uh uh group there.”
The 1983 Beirut bombing also struck the French contingent.
The Beirut attack involved separate truck bombings against the U.S. and French contingents of the multinational force; 58 French paratroopers were killed.
Sources
- 1Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations — Lebanon↗
Supports
On October 23, suicide bombers attacked the barracks of the U.S. and French contingents of the MNF, killing 241 American servicemen.
- 2Today in History: October 23, Beirut barracks bombings↗
Supports
On Oct. 23, 1983, 241 U.S. service members, most of them Marines, were killed in a suicide truck-bombing at the U.S. Marine Corps barracks at Beirut International Airport in Lebanon, while a near-simultaneous attack on French barracks in Beirut killed 58 paratroopers.
- 1Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations — Lebanon↗
-
Claim 83
“They did kill our airmen in Kobar towers in 1996 uh with the bombing there in Saudi Arabia.”
Iranian actors killed U.S. airmen in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia.
The June 25, 1996 Khobar Towers bombing killed 19 U.S. Air Force personnel. U.S. criminal and civil filings attributed planning and responsibility to Iranian officials and Iran-backed Saudi Hezbollah members.
Sources
- 1Attorney General Statement on Khobar Towers Indictment↗
Supports
As a result of this terrorist act, nineteen United States Airmen were killed and 372 Americans were wounded.
- 223-CV-00882 Asset Forfeiture Complaint↗
Supports
In June 1996, the IRGC was responsible for planning the attack on the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, during which 19 U.S.Air Force personnel were killed and more than 350 were injured.
- 1Attorney General Statement on Khobar Towers Indictment↗
-
Claim 84
“They did try to seize uh Mecca in 1979.”
Iran tried to seize Mecca in 1979.
The Grand Mosque in Mecca was seized in 1979, but the available U.S. historical record identifies the attackers as Saudi-led militants and explicitly reports no direct relationship with Iran.
Sources
- 1Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State: Occupation of Grand Mosque, Mecca↗
Refutes
The Grand Mosque in Mecca was seized by a Saudi religious fanatic, Muhammad Abdallah, 26 years old, a member of the Utayba tribe.
- 2Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State: Occupation of Grand Mosque, Mecca↗
Refutes
There is no rpt no direct relationship with Iran and Muhammad and his followers deny any Khomeini influence in their actions.
- 1Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State: Occupation of Grand Mosque, Mecca↗
-
Claim 85
“under the Clinton administration uh the Clinton administration to advance diplomacy said okay okay they're terrorists”
The Clinton administration designated the MEK as terrorists in 1997.
The State Department made the initial list of Foreign Terrorist Organization designations in October 1997 during the Clinton administration, and the MEK was included on that list.
Sources
- 1History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency↗
Supports
The Secretary designated the initial group of 30 foreign terrorist organizations in October 1997.
- 2Appendix B — Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations↗
Supports
First designated in October 1997.
- 1History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency↗
-
Claim 86
“we learned at that point that they were actually not supporting Saddam. They were there to go after Iran.”
The MEK was not supporting Saddam Hussein and was in Iraq only to fight Iran.
The MEK did oppose and attack Iran, but the claim denies its support from Saddam Hussein. U.S. government reporting says Saddam’s regime became the group’s primary source of support during the late 1980s.
Sources
- 1Appendix B — Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations↗
Refutes
The organization was expelled from Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and its primary support came from the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein since the late 1980s.
- 2Appendix B — Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations↗
Background
The MEK's history is filled with anti-Western attacks as well as terrorist attacks on the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad.
- 1Appendix B — Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations↗
-
Claim 87
“Iran experts say nobody in Iran supports them.”
Iran experts reportedly say that no one in Iran supports the group being discussed, apparently the MEK.
The claim relies on unnamed “Iran experts” and uses the absolute term “nobody,” but no identifiable consensus or comprehensive evidence establishes that no person in Iran supports the group. Available research says the MEK may lack broad popular support, which is weaker than saying it has no support at all.
Sources
- 1The Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) or People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)↗
Background
Limited public opinion polling suggests the group may not have broad popular support in Iran or within the Iranian-American diaspora.
- 2Iranian group's big-money push to get off US terrorist list↗
Background
Tehran-based Green supporter Hossein Barmaki says he has never met anyone who publicly or privately supports the MEK.
- 1The Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) or People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)↗
-
Claim 88
“Yes. Uhhuh. Yes. I've I've given many speeches there.”
Wesley Clark said he had given many speeches at events associated with the group.
Independent sources confirm that Clark repeatedly spoke at NCRI/MEK-associated events and received substantial speaking fees generally, but they do not establish that this group paid him specifically to lobby on its behalf. The payment and lobbying portion therefore cannot be independently verified from the available evidence.
Checked twice, independently: the first pass returned Accurate and the second Unverifiable. Recorded as Unverifiable.
Sources
- 1US Gen Wesley Clark: With Leadership on the Ground, We’ll Be in Tehran Next Year↗
Supports
General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Forces in Europe and Democratic Party’s Nominee for the United States President in 2004, was among the distinguished guests to address the Free Iran World Summit 2023.
- 2Clark Makes Public His Financial Data↗
Background
Clark's documents show he regularly received $25,000 to $30,000 per appearance in speaking fees.
- 1US Gen Wesley Clark: With Leadership on the Ground, We’ll Be in Tehran Next Year↗
-
Claim 89
“he stopped a lot of high-ranking members uh women, people of color in particular from being promoted.”
Pete Hegseth blocked promotions of multiple women and people of color in the military, disproportionately affecting those groups.
Reporting confirmed that Hegseth intervened to remove six officers from promotion lists, including four Army officers who were two Black men and two women, plus one Black and one female officer from another service. Reporting also described Black and female officers as disproportionately removed from promotion lists.
Sources
- 1Hegseth blocked 2 Black and 2 female soldiers from promotions↗
Supports
NPR has confirmed with two U.S. officials who are not authorized to speak publicly that Hegseth, in what's a highly unusual and possibly even illegal move, has stepped in to cross out four names off the list of army colonels who'd been recommended for promotion to one-star general. There were two Black men and two women.
- 2Here are the military and civilian leaders who've been fired, forced out or resigned since Hegseth became defense secretary↗
Supports
The Trump administration has pushed out top female and Black officers, and Black and female officers have been disproportionately removed from promotion lists, a source familiar with the lists told CBS News.
- 1Hegseth blocked 2 Black and 2 female soldiers from promotions↗
-
Claim 90
“The number of generals that have been fired and no excuse, no explanation is given.”
A number of generals and other senior military leaders were fired without stated explanations.
Multiple senior officers, including Charles Q. Brown and Lisa Franchetti, were removed without specific reasons being publicly stated at the time. Contemporary reporting described the removals as occurring without specified reasons, while later reporting documented a broader list of at least 20 senior military and civilian departures.
Sources
- 1Hegseth says he fired the top military lawyers because they weren't well suited for the jobs↗
Supports
The removals — which came without any specified reasons in terms of their conduct — sent a new wave of apprehension through the Pentagon.
- 2Here are the military and civilian leaders who've been fired, forced out or resigned since Hegseth became defense secretary↗
Supports
At least 20 generals, admirals and civilian defense leaders have been fired or have departed their jobs since Pete Hegseth became defense secretary at the beginning of the second Trump administration.
- 3Here are the military and civilian leaders who've been fired, forced out or resigned since Hegseth became defense secretary↗
Supports
Hegseth relieved Franchetti of her duties without explanation on the same day that Brown was fired.
- 1Hegseth says he fired the top military lawyers because they weren't well suited for the jobs↗